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Abstract
This report presents attack analysis results of the first adversarial engagement event stream for the
first engagement of the DARPA TC program conducted in October 2016. The analysis was performed
by Stony Brook University and University of Illinois at Chicago. The findings in this report are obtained
without prior knowledge of the attacks conducted.
1 Engagement 1 Analysis Results: UIC
1.1 Overview
We built a tag- and policy-based analysis system for attack detection and forensic analysis. Our system
tracks information flows from sources to sensitive sinks in real time, and raises alarms when the policies are
violated. In addition, it keeps a provenance context with every entity in the system. Specifically, provenance
context contains a list of the events and relationships that contribute to the existence of an entity. Using
such provenance context, we are able to provide an explanation for the raised alarms under the form of dot
graphs. During Engagement 1, we successfully detected the attacks on several TA1 traces and produced
graphs with details about those attacks.
1.2 Consumed TA1 Data and Challenges
At UIC, we consumed and analyzed CADETS traces for all three scenarios (BOVIA, PANDEX, and Stretch
Period).
1.3 Challenges
We faced several challenges due to data formats and lack of documentation about the traces. The data
format challenges were especially frustrating, since they required a large amount of effort to debug and fix.
More specifically, we spent around 70% on this task alone. We report below details about the most prominent
issues that we faced.
1.3.1 Data Format Challenges
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• Missing IPs. Sometimes, the IP address of a netflow object is not in the definition of the object.
Whereas, it is available in EVENT Socket or other events. Other times, there is no IP address for a
netflow object, neither in the definition nor in other related events. We treated these missing IPs as
untrusted and consequently had an increase in the false positives number.
• Inconsistent File Object URLs. Some versions of file objects have empty URL while other versions have
URL. Other times the URL is missing for all the versions of the file objects. In addition, many file
paths are in different fields like [‘‘properties’’][‘‘fdpath’’] or [‘‘properties’’][‘‘upath1’’]
while they are expected to be in URL field of file objects.
• Repeated UUIDs. In some cases, the same UUID is used for different objects like a file and a netflow.
• Redundant Data. There are multiple and unnecessary definitions of the same object.
• Unconnected Records. Some events are expected to be connected to netflow or file objects (like recvmsg),
but there are no SimpleEdge records for this.
• Missing Subject Names. The process names should be part of their definitions but usually, they can
be found in the exec field of other events generated by that process.
• Undefined UUIDs. Some UUIDs are used in events that are not defined in the trace, e.g., sending to a
UUID, for which there is not definition.
1.4 Technology Summary
Our system follows a tag- and policy-based approach for attack detection and forensic analysis. In particular,
we use tags to track information flow from predefined sources to sensitive sinks. We use 2 types of tags: 1)
integrity tags, and 2) confidentiality tags. Every relevant entity in the system being tracked is associated
with such tags and they are propagated to new entities as they are consumed from the TA1 traces.
1.4.1 Tags
Integrity tags. Integrity tags represent the degree of trustworthiness of the associated system entity. We
use code integrity tags to represent the trustworthiness of programs and code, and data integrity tags to
represent the trustworthiness of data. The code integrity tags are as follows:
1. Whitelist. Used to eliminate background noise.
2. Invulnerable. Used for programs that consume often low integrity data (e.g., browser). They can be
downgraded when they execute or load low integrity code.
3. Benign+authentic. Used for non malicious programs that are authenticated. These programs can be
downgraded when consuming low integrity code or data.
4. Benign. Used for non malicious programs, unless exposed to untrusted code or data.
5. Untrusted. Used for code from untrusted sources.
6. Malicious. Used for programs that exhibit clearly malicious behavior.
The data integrity tags include the last 4 tags of the above list (Benign+authentic, Benign, Untrusted,
Malicious).
Confidentiality tags. Confidentiality tags express the degree of secrecy of certain data and the degree of
protection they need. They are as follows:
1. Public. Readily available from public sources, no need to protect. Assigned to most code.
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2. Private. Data with some privacy concerns, but none too specific. Assigned to most data files and data
downloaded from most web sites.
3. Sensitive. Data with specific security or privacy concerns (e.g., server or host configuration files,
emails).
4. Secret. Data whose loss can enable impersonation (e.g., /etc/shadow, ssh host or user private keys.
1.4.2 Detection Policies and Forensics
Attack detection is guided by several policies, which make use of tags. These policies may deal with integrity
(e.g., raise an alarm if a low integrity file is executed), confidentiality (e.g., raise an alarm if secret information
flows to low integrity sockets), or a combination of both (e.g., raise an alarm if an untrusted program reads
a secret file and sends it to a low integrity socket).
In addition to the detection policies, our system contains a list of tag propagation policies, or rules, that
govern the propagation of tags through the system entities. These rules are specific to each event and are
executed as the events are consumed from the TA1 traces.
We have implemented several types of policies, that deal mainly with information flow from secret and
sensitive data to untrusted sockets and programs. Our policies make use of an initial of sources (list of IPs
that are untrusted, a list of files that are secret) and sinks (list of trusted IP addresses, secret and sensitve
files). As the records are consumed we maintain a data structure that represents the system entities and
their tags and use it to enforce the policies.
To support forensics, in addition to the tags, we associate a provenance context to each system entity.
This context contains all the events and entities that, starting from the sources, contribute to the state of a
system entity. This provenance context is propagated forward and augmented, as new events are consumed
from the TA1 traces. For instance, if a browser forks a shell, the fork event is added to the provenance
context of that shell. If that shell writes to a file, the context of the shell is copied to the context of the file,
and the write event is added to the context of the file. Therefore, the context of the file will contain both
the fork event and the write event. If that file is executed and a new process is created, its context is copied
to the context of the new process, and the execute event is added to it.
Using forward propagation of the provenance context, we are able to immediately obtain the history of
events that contributed to an alarm. In particular, for every alarm that is raised, our system processes the
provenance context of the entities involved in the alarm and produces a dot file that represents the history
of the alarm.
1.5 Results
In this section, we present our results on the CADETS traces. We successfully detected and reconstructed
the history of the attacks on the CADETS machines. For each scenario, we attach the graph of the attack.
In these graphs, we depict processes by ovals, file objects by rectangles, and sockets by diamonds. We use
labeled and directed edges to represent system calls. The direction of the edges represents the direction of
information flow, while the number of the edge labels represents the order of the system calls. We note, that
for space purposes and readability, we have removed several edges and nodes from the final result. These
represent activities that occur at the same time as the attack but are most likely not connected to it.
1.5.1 Bovia Scenario
In this scenario, we detected at least two instances of a similar attack, starting from the nginx server. In the
first instance, shown in the graph in Figure 1, the nginx server reads from bovia.com at 129.55.12.167:8000
(edge 20) and subsequently writes a file to ./var/tmp/nginx/client body temp/dropper, which is then sub-
sequently executed in a new process called dropper (edges 23, 24). The dropper process now communicates
with port 443 of bovia.com and subsequently writes a file to /tmp/sysman. Next, the dropper process creates
a shell (edge 29), which executes several system commands, including ls, whoami, hostname, uname. Each
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of these processes writes to the file /tmp/mailer/mailer.log. We believe that their output is redirected
to that file. Next, dropper writes to the file /tmp/mailer/mailman, which is subsequently executed (edges
76, 77). The resulting mailman process reads /tmp/mailer/mailer.log (edge 78) and sends its contents to
129.55.12.167:2525 (edges 79, 80, 81).
The second attack follows a similar pattern and it is shown in Figure 2. The steps up to the creation of
the dropper process are the same. However, in this second attack, dropper first writes to a file /tmp/sysman
and then executes that file. A shell is forked from dropper as well and a series of commands are run by it,
including ls, whoami, uname, netstat. The output of these commads is written to the file /tmp/syslog.dat,
which is later read by the sysman process and exfiltrated to 129.55.12.167:6666.
1.5.2 Pandex Scenario
This attack is shown in Figure 3. The machine has an sshd process running. At some point sshd, which
is possibly compromised, forks a bash process, we suspect under the command of the attacker (there is no
evidence from the dataset of the actual attack vector, but because of the subsequent events from this shell,
we conclude this is an attack). This bash process invokes a series of commands – hostname, whoami, date,
ps. These commands are examining the host information.
One of the processes invoked by this bash process is scp, which writes to the file /usr/home/bbn/./archiver.
This file will be executed later. We do not see in the trace the IP address from which scp copies this file.
At some later point, the same bash process creates a (sudoed) scp process, which creates a new object
(whose attributes are missing in the dataset) and which also downloads a file into location
/var/dropbear latest/dropbearFREEBSD.tar, which is then uncompressed.
The file dropbearscript is next read by sh, and interprets it. This action creates the process dropbearkey,
which writes to /usr/local/etc/dropbear/dropbear ecdsa host key and
/usr/local/etc/dropbear/dropbear rsa host key.
Next, another sudo process created by bash starts another dropbear process which reads these two keys
for future use (presumably to assist in connecting to a remote host).
Dropbear next starts a shell, sh, which executes a series of commands ls, bash, uname, ps, all of which
write to a file /usr/home/bbn/procstats. Another set of processes are created that run date, ls, netstat,
whoami and hostname. They write to another file (presumably a log), but the location and name attributes
of this file are missing in the dataset.
In addition, dropbear starts a bash process, which executes the file /usr/home/bbn/./archiver down-
loaded previously via scp. The resulting process, called archiver, reads the file /usr/home/bbn/procstats,
which contains the data output earlier, and exfiltrates this information to 128.55.12.167:2525.
1.5.3 Stretch Period
The results of the stretch period on the CADETS data re shown in Figure 4. In particular, among several
normal activities, we notice that the attack involves modifying the nginx server. In particular, we observed
that sshd spawns a shell, which is the used to start vi. Vi writes to the file ngx http request body.c
(edge 557). Next this file is compiled by make, which creates instances of cc and ld. The end result is
the executable /usr/ports/www/nginx/work/nginx-1.10.1/objs/nginx (edges 577-583). Next this file is
copied to /usr/local/sbin/nginx (edge 585), probably replacing the original nginx executable. Next,this
file is executed and it reads a number of password files /etc/spwd.db, /etc/login.conf.db, etc. We
believe that reading these files is probably legitimate behavior, since many programs routinely access those
files, to deal with access rights, hence they are not shown on the graph). Next, nginx forks a process
procstat, which writes to an unknown file (edges 666,667). This file is later read by nginx (edge 668), and
such read is followed by a SendTo event, which sends data (presumably the file’s data) to the IP address
129.55.12.167:1337.
In addition to nginx, we observed a tcpdump process as well running on the machine. This process
communicates with unknown IP addresses (probably localhost), which we could not see in the traces, and
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writes only to /dev/tty. We do not suspect this process to be malicious, unless /dev/tty is somehow used
as a channel for data exfiltration. In the trace there is a large number of processes interacting with /dev/tty.
1.5.4 Performance
The following table documents the performance of our system on the different CADETS traces. For each
data source, we report the number of CDM records, the duration of the trace in minutes, that is the amount
of tracking time, the consumption and analysis time of our system (column Analysis(mins)), as well as
the main memory used by our system. As can be noted, our system can consume and analyze the data
approximately 20 times faster than the speed at which they are generated (in average, under the conditions
of Engagement 1).
Data No. Records Duration(mins) Analysis(mins) Memory(MB)
Bovia 24’448’281 4736 220 872
Pandex 23’801’471 4744 198 955
Stretch 2’826’453 498 26 125
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2 Analysis of FiveDirections and TRACE Data: Stony Brook Uni-
versity
The key elements of our approach are described below.
2.1 Space-efficient main memory provenance graph representation
Our subteam is focused on real-time detection and analysis capabilities. We have found that graph databases
do not provide adequate performance at the data rates anticipated in TC. Hence we are targeting a main-
memory representation of the provenance graph. The goals of this main memory representation are:
• High fidelity provenance tracking: Efficiency or other considerations should not cause unrelated flows
to be “mixed up” in the graph. In a forensic analysis, we often do not know that a particular activity
was suspicious (or outright malicious) until a long time afterwards. If the graph prematurely conflates
data from two sources, it would be difficult to disentangle the flows and accurately identify the root
causes or initial triggers.
• Compact yet accurate representation of event data: The representation should not discard event data
that may be useful for anomaly detection, forensic analysis, or other tasks that may be performed
days, weeks or months after events took place. Our experiments with on-disk graph databases has
shown that graph operations would be several orders of magnitude slower than those on main memory
data structures. However, given the volume of TA1 data, main memory representations would be
overwhelmed unless ultra-compact representations are developed.
• Unified data representation across TA1s: CDM has achieved a level of uniformity at the syntactic level.
However, achieving semantic uniformity and consistency across TA1s has proven challenging because
of differences in operating systems, instrumentation approaches, and provenance-tracking capabilities
across TA1s. At the same time, it is not very practical or effective to develop (or re-implement)
analysis algorithms for specific TA1s. For this reason, we translate TA1 data into a common semantic
representation (CSR).
2.2 Provenance-based attack detection
Our approach uses provenance for real-time attack detection. Specifically, we assign integrity tags and
confidentiality tags to objects (files, IPCs, etc.) and subjects (processes). In the simplest case, there are two
levels of integrity: benign, representing data and code from sources that are trusted to be non-malicious, and
untrusted, representing code/data from anywhere else. Similarly, two level of confidentiality can be defined
in the simplest case: public and private.
Pre-existing objects and subjects are assigned initial tags. Newly created subjects inherit the tags of
their parents. Newly created objects inherit the tags of the process creating them. In addition, tags flow
with data. For instance, a benign subject will acquire untrusted tag if it reads an object with untrusted tag.
Based on these tags, we can raise alarms on several suspicious behaviors:
• Untrusted code execution: This alarm is raised when a subject with higher code integrity loads or
executes untrusted code.
• Undesired Subject/Object Downgrading: This alarm is raised when a higher integrity subject or object
is downgraded because of a flow from a source of lower integrity. This class captures attacks where
(a) a benign process is exploited by untrusted input, or (b) a compromised process corrupts a benign
object1.
1Note that objects here need not be files, but can be intranet sites as well. So, it should capture the example of a malicious
web site that contains JavaScript that accesses an intranet server. This assumes that the top-level browser does not read any
untrusted site, and only subprocesses/units/tabs do, and that these tabs run the malicious JS in question.
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• Confidential data leak: An alarm can be raised when untrusted subjects acquire (i.e., read) or exfiltrate
(i.e., write) sensitive data.
• Permission changes: When suspicious changes to file permissions occur, e.g., when an untrusted object
is made executable, an alarm can be raised2.
In our implementation, several additional levels of integrity and confidentiality are used. Moreover, tag
assignment, propagation and attack detection are all controlled by provenance policies that are can tuned
by a forensic analyst.
2.3 Tag-based forward analysis
This analysis is initiated when an alarm is raised by one of the policies described in the previous section. All
subsequent actions performed by the subject involved in the alarm, as well as its descendants, are emitted by
the system, and can be used to construct a graph of subsequent activities. In order to fine-tune the subgraph
that is emitted, we rely on the customizable policy framework mentioned in the last section. This allows us
to “tune out” uninteresting events, such as loads or reads of files with high integrity and low confidentiality.
In the first engagement, most of our successful analyses were based on the untrusted code execution alarm.
A secondary policy was defined to cope with instances where provenance is not accurately captured in TA1
data. In such a case, an object may be written, but we may not have the correct provenance, and hence its
tag may be incorrect. Our “backup” policy to deal with such instances was to flag execution of a previously
written file.
2.4 Performance
2.4.1 Size
Figure 5 shows the sizes and memory used for the data sets we consumed and successfully analyzed. In
summary, we make the following observations:
• We first translate CDM into our common semantic representation (CSR), a uniform representation
that we use across different OSes. CSR is stored in compressed (gzipped) format. On average, CSR is
about 40 times smaller than the binary representation used in CDM.
• On average, we use about one byte of memory per CDM record for data from FiveDirections, and
about 4 bytes per CDM record for data from Trace.
2.4.2 Runtime
2.4.3 Analysis Selectivity and Automation
In this section, we focus on how much automation is brought to the forensic analysis by our techniques. In
particular, attack detection is automated, and it identifies the most suspicious events. Starting from these
events, our system performs an automated forward analysis. During this analysis, configurable policies are
used to filter out uninteresting events performed by suspect processes (e.g., loads of benign libraries), while
retaining significant events. This results in a very small fraction of the CDM events being flagged for further
analysis.
In some cases, the filtered event set is small enough to be directly fed into a graph visualization program
such as graphviz. In other cases, the number of events is too large, and is subject to further manual analysis.
Figure 7 shows how selective these automated processes are. Less than one-thousandth of the CDM events
are flagged for further analysis.
2Note that this policy is applicable to file objects, as well as in-memory objects. Normal mmap/mprotects that occur in
conjunction with file loading are supposed to be recognized by the input stage, which instead reports a loadlib event.
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Data set CDM CSR CSR/CDM Main Memory/
size Size ratio memory CDM ratio
5D Bovia 150 MB 3 MB 2.0% 2.1 MB 1.4%
5D Pandex 130 MB 2.5 MB 1.9% 1.7 MB 1.3%
5D Stretch 49 MB 0.8 MB 1.6% 0.6 MB 1.2%
5D Mean 1.9% 1.3%
Trace Bovia 175 GB 4.7 GB 2.7% 11.3 GB 6.4%
Trace Pandex 111 GB 3.9 GB 3.5% 5.8 GB 5.2%
Trace Stretch 13 GB 0.4GB 3.1% 0.7 GB 5.4%
Trace Mean 3.1% 5.7%
Figure 5: Size of main memory provenance graph and common semantic representation (CSR). “CDM size”
refers to the size of CDM binary format, as stored in Kafka queues. CSR is stored in gzipped text format.
Data set CDM Duration Graph Construction Analysis
Time Speed-up Time Speed-up
5D Bovia 150 MB 19:43:46 0.92s 77 K 1.05s 68 K
5D Pandex 130 MB 23:15:42 0.75s 112 K 0.86s 97 K
5D Stretch 49 MB 06:22:42 0.24s 96 K 0.27s 85 K
5D Mean 95 K 83 K
Trace Bovia 175 GB 79:06:39 1.22h 65 K 2.5h 32 K
Trace Pandex 111 GB 79:05:13 0.77h 102 K 1.73h 46 K
Trace Stretch 13 GB 07:59:26 333s 86 K 375s 77 K
Trace Mean 84 K 52 K
Figure 6: Runtime performance for main memory provenance graph construction and analysis. “CDM size”
refers to the size of CDM binary format, as stored in Kafka queues. The data collection period is shown as
“duration,” in the format HH:MM:SS. Graph construction and analysis times are shown in either seconds or
hours. “Speed-up” is given by duration/time. It represents the average number of simultaneous data streams
that can be handled by our system while using a single core of a single processor. Performance measurements
were made on a 2.8GHz AMD Opteron 62xx processor, with 48GB main memory, and running Ubuntu 16.04.
Even in those cases where the approach is selective enough to be directly fed into a graph visualization tool,
the result of such an automated process will still include some details that are not critical for understanding
a scenario. Since one of our goals in this report is to provide graph representations that are easy for TA 5.1
to understand, we performed further interactive filtering and editing (of the above filtered events) to arrive
at the graphs shown in the next two sections.
2.5 Analysis of FiveDirections Data
2.5.1 Issues and Challenges
We successfully consumed data from FiveDirections. All three data sets (Bovia, Pandex and Stretch) were
successfully consumed. Traces of Bovia and Pandex are divided into multiple topics because of crashes of
their system. We are able to reconstruct the Bovia scenario and Stretch scenario. We analyzed the Pandex
scenario but there is nothing suspicious in the provided traces.
We encountered several significant difficulties with this data. First, network flows are encoded in CDM in
an unusual way that made it difficult to process them correctly, at least in the beginning. This is an instance
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Data set Number of Number of Number of
CDM records Filtered Events Alarms
5D Bovia 1.85 M 1.6 K 3
5D Stretch 509 K 0.18 K 4
Trace Bovia 2.3 B 28 K 12
Trace Pandex 1.5 B 25 K 6
Trace Stretch 168 M 4 K 4
Figure 7: Filtered events and alarms generated for further analysis
of the more general problem that CDM provides a syntax without nailing down the semantics. Second,
there is an inconsistency in how network I/O is handled, as compared to file I/O. In the case of network
connections, only the initial connection operation is reported, but none of the subsequent reads or writes.
In contrast, reads and write operations are reported on files, but the open operation goes unreported.
Other difficulties specific to FiveDirections are of greater concern to us going forward. First, access to
devices such as the keyboard, camera and microphone are not captured by FiveDirections. Second, activities
of system processes seem not to be captured in some cases. The Pandex scenario involves RDP, and it
appears that activities initiated through RDP are not recorded by Five Directions. This obviously makes it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to do any meaningful analysis of their Pandex data.
2.5.2 Bovia Scenario
This analysis applies to what we found in the fifth (last) Kafka queue for FiveDirections Bovia data. The
starting point of our analysis are the following two alarms generated by our system:
16-09-09 09:28:37.832: Alarm: UntrustedLoad: Object C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\firefox\dropper
Subject pid=560 C:\Program Files\Mozilla\firefox\firefox.exe
16-09-09 09:55:07.049: Alarm: UntrustedLoad: Object C:\dropper
Subject pid=1580 C:\Program Files\Mozilla\firefox\firefox.exe
Using forward analysis (as sketched in Section 2.3) from the point of the above alarms, we arrived at the
following reconstruction of the attack. The attack lasts for about half an hour. During this period, the
attacker seems to engage in 12 interactive sessions over which the attacker invokes over 60 commands that
end up executing about 6K to 7K system calls. Figures 8–9 illustrates the steps.
The entry point for the attack is Firefox, which seems to be compromised when visiting the web server at
129.55.12.167 on 9/9/16 at 9:28am. There are connections to this web server from about 3 minutes before this
point, with the difference that the last connection before the compromise goes to port 8000 rather than 80.
(Because of the lack of granularity in FiveDirections data, we cannot attribute the network source exactly;
instead we are hypothesizing that the last connection before the compromise is mostly likely responsible.)
When Firefox is compromised, a malicious program called dropper is downloaded. Firefox then executes
dropper. Dropper then invokes cmd.exe 12 times over the next half hour, using it to perform various data
gathering and exfiltration tasks, as described further below. Dropper is likely providing a remote interactive
shell capability, connecting to 129.55.12.167:4430 to receive commands and executing them via cmd.exe each
time.
Some of the cmd.exe sessions last less than a minute, while others last for maybe 10 minutes or more.
Some of these sessions invoke PowerShell.exe. Since there are so many cmd.exe sessions, we will summarize
the overall activity, instead of discussing each session in detail.
These various cmd.exe sessions collect data in a file called thumbs.db, which is then exfiltrated using git
to 129.55.12.51:9418. There is some activity by cmd.exe that looks like an attempt to reconfigure git to
connect to the malicious server in the future. Towards the end of the attack, several of git’s configuration
related files are cleaned up, presumably to clean up the system and avoid leaving any trails.
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Figure 8: FiveDirections: Bovia Scenario (1 of 3)
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Figure 9: FiveDirections: Bovia Scenario (2 and 3 of 3)
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Given that the attacker is able to freely access the files used by git, and what appears to be the project
directory (Thumb), the attacker could have modified these documents or source code, and pushed them to
the repository. However, we cannot find any evidence that this was actually done, as we don’t see source
code files or meaningful document files being edited or modified in another way.
In one of the sessions, information gathering commands such as whoami, hostname and netstat are run,
and the results are saved into a file called C:\Users\5d_tc\Documents\Thumbs\thumbs.db. Sometimes the
name changes to C:\Users\5d_tc\Documents\Thumbs\thumbit\test\thumbs.db. In the end, both files are
removed in order to hide the attacker’s trail.
Another session seems to scan all of the directories under \Users\5d_tc. This could be a case of an
attacker interactively examining the system. We cannot find any sign of the resulting data being saved to a
file or exfiltrated.
At the very end, dropper downloads a batch file called burnout.bat into Firefox download directory and
then executes it. The purpose of this batch file seems to be to delete dropper as well as burnout.bat from
the system, thus removing all signs of a break-in.
2.5.3 Pandex Scenario
We were told that RDP played a central role in the Pandex attack. Based on our discussions with FiveDirec-
tions, it appears that activities initiated through RDP are not recorded by Five Directions. This obviously
makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to do any meaningful analysis of their Pandex data.
We fell back on our “backup” detection technique, looking for files that are written during the engagement
and then subsequently loaded or executed. Based on our understanding of the rules of engagement, these
attacks involve, at some point, downloading a file that is then loaded or executed. While the mechanism
for downloading may differ (e.g., download via browser, email, or a remote login session; download of an
executable, DLL, or a file taken as input by an interpreter), we did expect there to be malicious executable
content that is saved on the disk.
However, we found that none of the files written during the engagement were loaded or executed, not
even by interpreters. In fact, we looked at the set of all files written on any of the four Kafka queues for
FiveDirections Pandex, and compared it with the list of files executed/loaded across them, and again found
no intersection. This could, of course, be the result of above-mentioned gaps in FiveDirections data — files
written as a result of an RDP session may not be captured in the data.
As a last resort, we looked at the list of all programs and DLLs loaded or executed in the last Kafka
queue for Pandex scenario, and did not find even a single suspicious-looking process.
While our reasons for missing data are speculative, it seems safe to say that there is minimal, if any,
trace of attack in this data.
2.5.4 Stretch Scenario
The starting point for our analysis are the following four alarms from one of our detectors. (We enabled
only one of our detectors that detects untrusted code execution.)
16-09-27 10:46:38.093: Alarm: UntrustedLoad: Object C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\mozillanightly
Subject pid=3244 C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\firefox\firefox.exe
16-09-27 10:48:42.855: Alarm: UntrustedLoad: Object C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\photosnap.exe
Subject pid=3548 C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\mozillanightly
16-09-27 10:48:54.458: Alarm: UntrustedLoad: Object C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\mozillanightly
Subject pid=3404 C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\firefox\firefox.exe
16-09-27 14:22:12.615: Alarm: UntrustedLoad: Object C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\firefox\mozillanightly
Subject pid=3196 C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\firefox\firefox.exe
From the alarms, it is clear that two versions of mozillanightly malware are being downloaded. The first
version is executed twice, while the second version is executed once. Using forward analysis (as sketched in
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Figure 10: FiveDirections: Stretch Scenario (1 of 2)
Section 2.3) from the point of the above alarms, we arrived at the following reconstruction of the attack.
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the steps of this attack.
The attack begins with what seems to be a browser compromise of Firefox at 10:45:38, which causes
a malicious executable mozillanightly to be downloaded from IP address 129.55.12.167:8000. There is a
second download of malware with the same name at 14:22:12. These are stored in two different places, as
shown in Figures 10 and 11.
At 10:47, Firefox executed C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\mozillanightly, which downloads photosnap.exe
from 129.55.12.167:4430. Then mozillanightly executes photosnap.exe. Since FiveDirections does not
record device access, there is no direct information about the input to photosnap.exe. However, from the
DLLs it loads, we surmise it is either taking a picture using the camera or performing a screengrab. The
results are saved in a couple of temporary files (img57.tmp and img58.tmp). Subsequently, the contents of
these files seem to be copied over into C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\pic.png, and then this file is sent out
to 129.55.12.167:4430. At last, mozillanightly invokes cmd.exe to remove pic.png and photosnap.exe.
At 10:49, Firefox executes C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\mozillanightly again, but nothing special hap-
pens in this session. Perhaps the attacker was interactively examining the system, running commands such
as hostname and whoami, but no files seem to have been created or exfiltrated.
At 14:32, Firefox executes C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\firefox\mozillanightly again, which in turn
invokes cmd.exe to run hostname.exe, whoami.exe and netstat.exe. The results of these commands are
written to a file named C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\firefox\4662.log.
Then mozillanightly downloaded C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\firefox\mnsend.exe from 129.55.12.167:4430,
and it invoked cmd.exe to execute mnsend.exe to send 4662.log to 129.55.12.167: 7770, and then it removed
4662.log and mnsend.exe.
At last, mozillanightly downloads C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\firefox\burnout.bat from 129.55.12.167:4430.
When burnout.out executes, it completes the clean up after the attack, removing C:\Users\5d_tc\Downloads\firefox\mozillanightly
and burnout.bat.
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Figure 11: FiveDirections: Stretch Scenario (2 of 2)
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2.6 Analysis of Trace Data
2.6.1 Issues and Challenges
We have successfully consumed all three data sets from (Bovia, Pandex and Stretch). We were able to
reconstruct all three scenarios and detect the attacks. Consuming the data turned out to be challenging as
there were some changes of semantics in the data representation during the engagement compared with the
data that we got previously. For example, CREATE events edges that contained file uuid information were
switched between toUuid and fromUuid during the engagement.
There were 60 times more memory objects than all the file and netflow objects combined, which created
an explosion in the number of events related to them. For example there were 276 million memory objects in
the Bovia scenario, even a single event occurrence on each memory object leads to generate approximately
1 billion records (definition of the memory object, event definition and 2 edges), which is almost half the
records in the scenario.
Instead of handling stdin, stdout and stderr, they were reported as SrcSink objects with the only indi-
cation that they were indeed stdin, stdout and stderr being the file descriptor. Also, there were pipes which
were read from but were never written to, which leads us to think of missing information flow from the
program’s stdout to pipes. Also, the case where pipes were written to and never read from was seen. This
was seen in the attack scenario, in the stretch data, where the program that performed cat operation on the
passwd file writes to a pipe and an openssl program also writes to that same pipe, but that pipe was never
read from. As a result, this data does not tell us where the information went. Other issues include:
• subjects that did not have proper clone and execve sequences
• multiple unlink operations on the same object
• netflow objects with no IP addresses, and
• declaration of unused subjects/objects.
The only way we found to consume the data was to drop events affected by these issues and also drop SrcSink
objects and related events except for the ones related to stdin, stdout and stderr. As a result, significant
provenance information may have been lost.
2.6.2 Bovia Scenario
The Bovia scenario covers a period of about 4 days, and consists of four “episodes.” Figures 12–14 illustrate
the first three episodes. The last episode is somewhat large, and hence is broken up into two parts in
Figures 15 and 16.
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2.6.3 Pandex Scenario
The Pandex scenario covers a period of about 3 days. On 9/7 at 15:44:03, the attacker first creates a
directory /var/dropbear latest and then downloads the file dropbearLINUX.tar to that directory using
scp from kududyn@128.55.12.167:/work/pandex software/dropbear/dropbearLINUX.tar. The attacker
performs tar xvf dropbearLINUX.tar, which creates and chmod’s the files dropbearkey, dropbearscript
and dropbear. Next, the attacker creates /etc/dropbear directory and executes dropbearkey program,
which generates dropbear rsa host key, dropbear ecdsa host key and dropbear dss host key in that di-
rectory. The attacker then runs ./dropbear -p 1337, which uses all the three keys generated by dropbearkey
program and performs exfiltration. On 9/9 at 10:23:24, the attacker performs a cleanup by running the
shred program on the three keys and then performing rm -rf on them. In addition, rm -rf is done on the
/etc/dropbear folder and the /var/dropbear latest folder.
The attack consist of several information gathering sessions, followed by exfiltration. These exfiltrations
occur to the following IP addresses at the following times:
• IP:128.55.12.167:38509 on 9/7 18:27:58
• IP:128.55.12.167:38510 on 9/7 18:28:15
• IP:128.55.12.167:39335 on 9/8 13:35:41
• IP:128.55.12.167:39490 on 9/8 16:55:27
• IP:128.55.12.167:40246 on 9/8 10:22:04
The Figure 17 describes the attack.
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8. WRITE
18:00:05
9. READ
18:00:2510. REMOVE
11. REMOVE
Figure 12: Trace Bovia Scenario: Episode 1. This episode starts with the download of the malicious
file /home/steve/traffic gen/dropper from 129.55.12.167:8000 and its execution on 9/6 at 17:58:47. Next
the attacker gains a remote shell through 129.55.12.167:4430 and executes whoami, hostname, uname -a,
ifconfig, and netstat -nap, and performs a cat on /etc/hosts and /etc/network/interfaces. The
dropper process creates /tmp/netrecon and performs chmod on it. Next, netrecon is executed, which
results in the creation of /tmp/netrecon.log file. This file is read by the dropper process and exfiltrated
to 129.55.12.167:4430. Finally, at 18:01:00, netrecon, netrecon.log and dropper files are deleted from the
system.
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Figure 13: Trace Bovia Scenario: Episode 2. This episode starts with the download of
/home/steve/traffic gen/dropper from 129.55.12.167:8000 and its execution on 9/7 at 14:40:51. Next
the attacker executes hostname. The dropper process creates /tmp/netrecon and /tmp/screengrab files
and performs chmod on them. The netrecon file is executed and it generates /tmp/netrecon.log file. The
execution of /tmp/screengrab probably generates /tmp/sgout.png but it was not seen in the data either
the program failed or the TA1 team failed to capture it. Next, netrecon.log is read by the dropper process.
After that the attacker deletes netrecon, netrecon.log, and screengrab and sgout.png files. The attacker
performs ls, presumably to check if the files were deleted properly. Finally, the dropper file is deleted at
14:48:48.
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Figure 14: Trace Bovia Scenario: Episode 3. This episode also begins with the download of
/home/steve/traffic gen/dropper from 129.55.12.167:8000 and its execution on 9/7 at 17:39:25. Next,
the attacker executes the programs hostname and uname -a, with output written to /tmp/perfdata.log.
The dropper process downloads /tmp/netrecon and performs chmod on it. Next, netrecon is executed,
which results in the creation of /tmp/netrecon.log file. The attacker performs a cat on netrecon file and
the output is written to perfdata.log. Next, shred is run on netrecon and netrecon.log, presumably
to destroy evidence of the break-in. Then the dropper process downloads /tmp/perfman file and performs
chmod on it. Next, perfman is executed with perfdata.log file, and then shred is run on perfman. On the
next day at 13:19:14, the dropper file is deleted.
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Figure 15: Trace Bovia Scenario: Episode 4 (Part 1). This episode begins with the download
of /home/steve/traffic gen/dropper from 129.55.12.167:8000 and its execution on 9/8 at 15:05:47. The
attacker gathers information via uname -a and whoami and sends it through 129.55.12.167:4430. The dropper
program creates another file /home/steve/updater and performs chmod on it. More information is gathered
using netstat -na and ifconfig -a, and is written to the file /home/steve/update.data. The updater
program is then run with update.data file and the information is sent to 129.55.12.167:6666. After this,
update.data is deleted. The attacker runs the programs uname -a, whoami, ls -laR and the output is written
to the file /home/steve/pii.data. The updater program is then run with pii.data and the information
is sent to 129.55.12.167:6666. After that the file pii.data is deleted. Next the updater program is deleted.
The attacker next checks the directory by running ls and dir.
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Figure 16: Trace Bovia Scenario: Episode 4 (Part 2). On 9/9 08:35:35 the attacker runs the following
programs: hostname, ifconfig eth1.129, ifconfig, ifconfig em1.192, ifconfig em1.129, and ls. Later
mkdir rootman is run. The dropper program creates the file /home/steve/rootman/rmanager and peforms
chmod on it. The attacker at this point runs the following programs using a remote shell: whoami, hostname,
uname -a, ls -laR /home/steve and the output is written to a file /home/steve/rootman/.dat. Later cat
is run on it. The file is also opened with vi. The rmanager program is then run with the .dat file and the
information is sent to 129.55.12.167:2525. Next the attacker checks the directory by running ls and ls -la
and also checks running processes using ps and ps aux. After that the attacker performs shred on both the
.dat file and on rmanager. The directory /home/steve/rootman is then deleted. At 08:44:55 the attacker
deletes the dropper file.
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2.6.4 Stretch Scenario
The stretch scenario consists of two “episodes.” Figures 18 and 19 illustrates these episodes.
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Figure 17: Trace Pandex Scenario.
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Figure 18: Trace Stretch Scenario: Episode 1. The attack begins with what seems to be a browser
compromise of Firefox at 11:36:51, which causes a malicious executable mozillanightly to be downloaded
from IP address 129.55.12.167:8000 and executed. This allows the attacker to gain a remote shell through
IP address 129.55.12.167:4430. The attacker executes the programs hostname and whoami. At 11:38:20,
mozillanightly creates /home/steve/traffic gen/mozillaautoup and performs a chmod on it with per-
mission 777. This file is executed at 11:38:28 by mozillanightly and a file /tmp/netrecon.log is cre-
ated and written to. The attacker performs ls and ls /tmp, probably to check through the remote shell
whether the files were created. The file netrecon.log is read, and the information is sent to the IP address
129.55.12.167:443. At 11:39:27, the attacker deletes /tmp/netrecon.log and performs ls again through the
remote shell. At 11:39:36 the file /home/steve/traffic gen/mozillaautoup is deleted. At 11:39:42 the
malicious executable /home/steve/traffic gen/mozillanightly is deleted.
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Figure 19: Trace Stretch Scenario: Episode 2. In the second attack, compromised firefox downloads
the malicious executable /home/steve/traffic gen/mozillanightly again at 13:27:37 through IP address
129.55.12.167:8000 and executes it. This allows the attacker to gain a remote shell again through IP address
129.55.12.167:4430. The attacker first executes whoami program. Then the attacker performs cat on the
/etc/passwd file and writes to it. Next the cat program is run on the /etc/shadow file and also written
to. After that, the attacker writes to the /etc/sudoers file at 13:32:18 and executes cat on the file. The
malicious downloaded file /home/steve/traffic gen/mozillanightly is deleted at 13:32:34.
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